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with social norms when nobody is
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Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer
punishment, the desire for others’ esteem and the desire to meet others’ expectations.
Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others’ expectations can sustain
compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models
have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence
is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others’ “empirical”
or “normative” expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this
motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet.
Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions,
the perceived legitimacy of others’ normative expectations can motivate a significant
number of people to comply with costly social norms.
Keywords: social norm compliance, empirical and normative expectations, trust, guilt aversion, verbal
communication, resentment hypothesis, legitimacy
Introduction
Our everyday life is structured around many recurrent social situations in which we choose to
act in ways that conform at least to one underlying social norm. Greeting is just one mundane
example in which we typically behave as we are expected to: one is prepared to extend the right
hand to greet, but to bow instead if bowing is expected (as it is in Japan, for instance). Queuing for
a taxi at the airport is another common one: if people are expected to wait in line before claiming
a free taxi, they typically conform to this shared expectation. When no such shared expectation is
present, people behave in much less predictable ways. Why do people typically comply with social
norms?
One standard explanation for social situations resembling the greeting example is that the
decision to comply stems from the common interest to coordinate over some compatible behaviors.
Here the problem is that there might be more than one way in which we could coordinate: to
express our mutual respect, we could both shake our right hands or we could both bow. In these
situations, expecting others to behave in a definite manner, and being likewise expected, would give
one a sufficient reason to conform to the shared expectation simply out of our independent (and
compatible) self-interests. In other words, these social situations are regulated by that special kind
of social norms that are conventions (Lewis, 1969; Sugden, 2004; Bicchieri, 2006; Tummolini et al.,
2013).
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This explanation, however, does not easily extend also to our
second example. Indeed when queuing for a taxi, we are not
taking part to a coordination game but to a mixed-motive one:
a situation in which our interests are not perfectly aligned. Each
of us, in fact, would like to take a taxi as fast as possible, and thus
would benefit more by jumping the line—if he or she expects all
the others to stand there quietly—than by joining in with the rest
and waste time. So, even if the next guy is expected to fall in
line, he could do better by going straight to the taxi: if so, why,
typically, will he stand there with the others? In other words, why
should a person be motivated to comply with social norms, when
this is contrary to self-interest?
The most common answer is that the violator will be
punished by those following the norm (for a review see Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004a). The fear of being punished by peers is
certainly an important motive behind social norm compliance
and the role of punishment in the evolution and maintenance
of social norms is well understood (Boyd et al., 2003, 2010).
Indeed, even if queuing is not formally enforced, the majority
of those standing in line are frustrated by the occasional jumper,
and some of them may also be prepared to actively intervene to
inflict material costs on the violator, thereby making the decision
to comply actually aligned with his or her self-interest (Fehr and
Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004b).
Punishment has received much attention in the literature on
social norms, despite the fact that, outside the lab, the imposition
of material costs on norm violators by peers is more an exception
than the rule (Guala, 2012).
In fact, people might be more readily prepared to sanction
one another’s behavior with more immaterial currencies, by, for
instance, rewarding those who behave as expected, with esteem
or respect and by withdrawing such immaterial benefits from
those who violate (Brennan and Pettit, 2000). In a seminal field
experiment on intrusions in queues (Milgram et al., 1986), for
instance, only 10% of reactions were carried out with some
form of material punishment, while the rest employed either
verbal or nonverbal expressions of disapproval. These reactions
to violations can actually be effective if people care about
their status vis-à-vis one another, and give some weight to the
public perception of their behavior. This additional weight may
explain conformity even without facing the prospect of material
punishment (see for instance Bernheim, 1994)1. Differently from
fear of punishment, the desire for status or esteem requires that
people also value one another’s opinions, that is, they should
value also what others think of them as opposed to care only
for what others might do to them. Moreover, in this view, such
an appetite for esteem (and aversion to the risk of losing it)
would be connected to more complex emotions than mere fear.
Shame, for instance, is intrinsically related to one’s self-esteem
and the esteem that others grant us, and presupposes a desire to
be positively evaluated by others relative to a shared standard,
which in this case is provided by the social norm itself (Miceli
and Castelfranchi, 1998).
1An individual’s status can be also be interpreted as his reputation, and it can be
used by peers to administer punishment of violations. This is another mechanism
that supports the emergence and stability of social norms. See Kandori (1992).
Still, in many situations, the violator cannot be easily spotted,
if not else because nobody is watching all the time. If fear
of peer punishment or the desire for others’ esteem (and to
avoid shame) were the sole motivations behind social norm
compliance, everyone would be prepared to violate when sure to
be unseen. Consider, for instance, a smoker who lives in a country
where cigarette butts are routinely thrown on the ground. When
traveling to a place where he knows that he is expected to throw
them in the bin, the smoker would not be careless because he
would expect that someone might physically step in. He might be
less concerned with the withdrawal of esteem by these strangers,
though, since he might feel that he has not much in common
with them. Were nobody there to police, however, there would
be nobody to impose costs or to negatively assess, and thus
the smoker could as well ignore the material or immaterial
consequences for the occasional violation. Still, we suggest, he
might feel the pressure of being expected to conform anyway, and
this pressure could be enough to comply.
To explain social norm compliance when there is no private or
public monitoring, or, more in particular, when there is no scope
for punishment—as in one-shot encounters between strangers—
or for the assignment or withdrawal of esteem by relevant peers,
an additional motivation should then be considered.
As far as social norm compliance is concerned, the desire
to avoid punishment and the desire for others’ esteem have
something in common: both motivate to behave as expected for
instrumental reasons only. Hence, a natural alternative is that
people might be intrinsically motivated to comply with social
norms, which would be the case, for instance, if they desired to
meet others’ expectations per se. How could such a motivation be
understood?
In the context of social norms, a desire of this kind has
been proposed by Robert Sugden with his resentment hypothesis
(Sugden, 2000, 2004). In particular, in Sugden’s view, when a
social norm exists, people come to have normative expectations
about each other, which are considered as nothing but “a
special kind of empirical expectation which one person holds
about another person’s action” and which have “some power to
motivate that other person to act in conformity with it” (2000,
p. 115). Consider, for instance, the social norm prevailing in
US according to which diners typically leave a 15% tip. If I
am traveling there and I have been told about this custom, I
will know that the waiter expects that I leave a 15% tip as
well: failing to live up to such expectation would plausibly have
some psychological cost for me2. Intuitively, once the waiter
reasonably expects customers to leave a 15% tip, he would
be disappointed at frustration of his expectations and would
feel resentment toward those who frustrate them. According
to Sugden’s Resentment hypothesis, awareness of this tendency
induces an aversion toward doing any action that would trigger
it3. In other words, people are intrinsically averse to be the target
2That this cost is tied to the waiter’s expectations and not to a more general
altruistic attitude toward a worker’s welfare is evident if one considers that no
pressure is felt to tip a shop assistant who typically does not expect it.
3It is essential to Sugden’s theory that this aversion does not presuppose any belief
that one ought to do the socially expected action, but only that such action is
what others have reason to believe that one will do. This is why he considers
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of others’ resentment. Such an aversion is displayed, for instance,
by someone who wants to avoid the guilt he would experience
if he were to harm others relative to what they expected to
obtain (Baumeister et al., 1994; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007).
Inspired by this view, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) have
proposed that guilt aversion might provide a micro-foundation
for social norm compliance. Referring to the same tipping
example, they suggest that once “there is a norm, it shapes
the [waiter]’s expectation, and the customer lives up to this
expectation because he would feel guilty if he did not” (Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006, p. 1596).
Both Sugden’s resentment hypothesis and Charness and
Dufwenberg’s guilt aversion theory point to a motivation to
behave as expected that implies intrinsic compliance with social
norms. This motivation differs from fear of punishment and from
the desire for others’ esteem since these motives provide only
instrumental reasons for compliance. Both proposals, however,
also reduce normative expectations to empirical ones. That is, in
both theories, whether one has an empirical justified belief that
someone else will act in a certain way (empirical expectation) or
a normatively justified belief about how someone ought to behave
(normative expectation) is irrelevant to explain the motivating
power of these expectations. This implies, unfortunately, that the
desire to meet others’ empirical expectations cannot but be a
form of altruism after all. If one gives some weight in one’s own
decision making on whether some stranger, as a consequence of
one’s violation, achieves less than what he or she expected to, then
this belief-dependent motivation is just another kind of social
preference for the stranger’s welfare (Attanasi and Nagel, 2008).
There is, however, also another way to understand this
motivation to behave as expected.
Cristina Bicchieri, in her seminal theory of social norms
(Bicchieri, 2006), has, for instance, suggested that an under-
explored motive for social norm compliance is the perceived
legitimacy of others’ normative expectations (Bicchieri, 2006, p.
24). In her view, normative expectations are understood as what
one believes that others think one ought to do, i.e., what one is
normatively expected to do4. Together with the fact that a given
social norm is indeed regularly followed and with appropriate
empirical expectations (i.e., the first-order belief that others will
comply with the social norm), normative expectations provide
a reason to follow the social norm. Aside from the motivations
discussed above (fear of punishment and the desire for esteem),
an important reason is that one perceives as legitimate what one
is normatively expected to do. Perceived legitimacy of normative
expectations reflects the fact that a social norm is accepted and
that one acknowledges the others’ normative claim for expecting
a certain action5. Being prepared to offer an excuse for one’s
behavior is, for instance, a signal that one perceives the normative
claim of another one as legitimate. Being willing to accept
normative expectations as a special kind of empirical ones (i.e., plain predictions).
For counterarguments, see Anderson (2000), Verbeek (2002), Tummolini et al.
(2013), and Colombo (2014).
4These are second-order beliefs that should be distinguished from one’s own
personal normative belief: my belief that others believe that I ought to do A vs.
my belief that I ought to do A.
5For the notion of norm acceptance see, for instance, Gibbard (1990).
punishment is another (Faillo et al., 2013). Without aiming to
unpack perceived legitimacy any further, it is here important
to emphasize that perceived legitimacy pertains to normative
expectations and not to empirical ones6: to the motivational
power of beliefs about what others think that one “ought” to do.
We hypothesize that perceived legitimacy may be sufficient to
motivate some people to behave as expected, and that, if it were
so, these people would be motivated to live up to the expectations
of others irrespective of being watched.
Thus, in theory, both the desire to meet the empirical
expectations of others (the aversion to be the target of
others’ resentment or to feel the guilt for having disappointed
them7) and the desire to meet their normative ones (perceived
legitimacy) predict that compliance with a social norm is possible
even if nobody is watching. Which of the two is the most relevant
in practice is, however, an empirical question.
The aim of this paper is then to present a new experimental
design to isolate the desire to meet others’ expectations from
other possible motivations to comply with social norms like
fear of punishment and the desire for others’ esteem. Moreover,
our aim is to establish whether this desire ranges over others’
empirical or normative expectations.
Disentangling the Motivations for Social
Norm Compliance: Three Requirements
Disentangling in an experiment the three main motivations
behind social norm compliance that we have identified—fear of
peer punishment, the desire for others’ esteem (and to avoid
shame), the desire to meet others’ expectations—is not an easy
task.
While punishment can be easily controlled for by not giving
such an option to experimental subjects and by avoiding repeated
encounters (i.e., by using one-shot games with anonymous
subjects who cannot punish one another), isolating the desire
for others’ esteem from the desire to meet others’ expectations
is more challenging.
The reason for this methodological difficulty is that both
motivations are easily confounded since both depend on
information about beliefs of others.
From a theoretical point of view, this information is, however,
different.
The desire for others’ esteem depends on what one believes
that another person believes about oneself at the end of an
interaction (i.e., on ex-post information about beliefs of others;
see Tadelis, 2011). For instance, if I am worried to lose my
status with another one, I can decide to act in accordance with
a social norm in order to avoid that another one will believe
6For more insights on what perceived legitimacy amounts to, see the Discussion
below.
7For clarity, in what follows we will mention only “guilt aversion” to refer to the
construal of the intrinsic desire to meet others’ expectations offered in Sugden
(2000, 2004) and in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). The main difference
between the two proposals is just one of focus: while Sugdenmodels themotivation
as an aversion to be the target of others’ resentment, Charness and Dufwenberg
emphasize the distress one would feel for others’ disappointment. This distinction
does not seem to have empirical consequences for the aims of this paper.
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that I am a “bad” guy after our interaction is completed. This
negative assessment would diminishmy status, and, if I anticipate
it, I may decide to conform to the social norm (Bernheim,
1994).
On the contrary, the desire to meet others’ expectations
depends on what one believes that others believe about oneself
before the interaction takes place (i.e., on ex-ante information
about beliefs of others). This means that, if I have such desire,
I am concerned with not disappointing others’ already existing
expectations about me, something that would happen if I violated
the social norm. Thus, to avoid this, I may choose to conform
(Sugden, 2000, 2004; Bicchieri, 2006).
As a consequence, the first requirement to disentangle these
two motivations experimentally is to be able to manipulate
subjects’ accessibility to both ex-post and ex-ante information
about beliefs of others.
From a formal point of view, the best tool to represent
these motivations is provided by psychological game theory
(Geanakoplos et al., 1989). Psychological game theory, PGT, is a
generalization of traditional game theory in which an individual’s
utility does not only depend on which actions are chosen by
the parties but also on their beliefs, and thus it can be used to
model belief-dependent preferences of the kind we are interested
in. Moreover, with dynamic psychological game theory (Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2009), one is also able to capture the role of
higher-order beliefs, of beliefs of others, and also their update
during interaction, which is exactly what understanding the
desire for esteem or the desire to meet others’ expectations
require. For these reasons, leading contributions in the theory
of social norms have adopted precisely this framework (e.g.,
Bernheim, 1994; Sugden, 2000, 2004; Bicchieri and Sontuoso,
2015).
From an experimental point of view, however, being able to
control the information that subjects can access and the way they
form and update their beliefs is more difficult. Notwithstanding
how much anonymity is protected and how difficult it is to infer
something about others, subjects may still take into account what
others might think of them.
One way out of this methodological complexity is to create a
design in which subjects, who are mainly driven by one motivation
will choose differently from those driven by another one. Our
second requirement is then to have a design matching this
feature.
Finally, since we are concerned with social norm compliance,
there should be a reliable way to make a social norm sufficiently
salient for subjects (Cialdini et al., 1991; Bicchieri, 2006; Conte
et al., 2014), since if nothing points to a social norm, it is
unclear how subjects might decide to conform to it. A typical
way in which a social norm can be made salient is if subjects
are allowed to engage in pre-play verbal communication by
sending, for instance, a written message. According to Bicchieri
(2002), for instance, verbal communication typically inflates
cooperation rates in social dilemma kind of situations (for
reviews see Sally, 1995 and Balliet, 2010) precisely because it has
the effect of making specific behavioral rules situationally salient
for participants, and this effect induces the individuals to orient
their attention to the strategies prescribed by such rules (see also
FIGURE 1 | The risky Trust game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
The dashed arrow means that the trustee (B) can unilaterally send a message
to the trustor (A). Payoffs are expressed in Euros.
Andrighetto et al., 2013)8. Thus, our third and last requirement is
that of using verbal communication to make a social norm salient
between the subjects.
Experimental Design and Procedures
A Risky Trust Game with Communication,
Exposure and a “Wiggle Room”
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006; C&D henceforth) have
proposed an elegant design to test whether the effect of verbal
communication on cooperation—trust and trustworthiness, in
particular—can be explained by guilt aversion, an important
way to model the desire to meet others’ expectations (for the
theoretical model see Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). Given
the role that psychological game theory plays in their experiment
and the use of communication, this design offers an ideal starting
point for our aims.
C&D design is a trust game with a hidden action, a risky
component, and with the possibility for the trustee to send a
non-binding message (see Figure 1).
In this variant of the Trust game, a trustor (A) is endowed with
a certain amount of money and can choose a safe option (5e,
5e), thereby deciding not to enter in the game (OUT option),
or to transfer the endowment (IN option) to the matched trustee
(B). By choosing the IN option, the amount of money transferred
to B is multiplied. Before making this decision, each B has the
possibility to send a non-bindingmessage to his matched A. After
having decided whether or not to send the message, B chooses
whether to ROLL or DON’T ROLL a six-sided dice. If B decides
not to roll the dice, the amount of money remains with B (0e,
14e); otherwise, by rolling the dice, there is 1/6 probability that
A will receive 0 and B 10e and 5/6 probability that A will receive
12e and B 10e. Crucially, in the original C&D design, trustors
could not directly observe the actions of their counterparts, and
thus could not discriminate a bad outcome due to untrustworthy
behavior from mere bad luck9.
8Consistently, Dufwenberg et al. (2011) have found that framing influence
behaviors by influencing beliefs first, and have suggested that verbal
communication might indeed operate as kind of framing effect endogenously
produced by the communicating parties.
9This structure is intended to represent a situation in which one person, A, is
considering whether to form a partnership with another one, B, in order to realize a
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The hidden action component and the use of communication
match well with our requirements 1 (the need to control for ex-
ante and ex-post information about belief of others) and 3 (the
use of verbal communication to make a social norm salient).
Unfortunately, these features are not sufficient to disentangle the
role of the desire for esteem from the intrinsic desire to meet
others’ expectations since both types of subjects might choose the
same actions (in contrast with our requirement 2)10.
In order to meet also our requirement 2, we have modified the
original C&D design in two ways.
First, we have made the action chosen by B observable. In this
version of the risky Trust game with “exposure,” A was informed
at the end of the game about the action that B has chosen (see the
instructions in the Supplementary Materials for further details).
Tadelis (2011) and Bracht and Regner (2013) have contrasted the
risky Trust game with and without exposure since the former, but
not the latter, allows exploring a concern for ex-post perception,
i.e., a concern for what the others think of oneself at the end
of the interaction. As clarified above, such a concern should be
especially appealing to those who care for others’ esteem because
being perceived as a “bad” player—one who has decided not
to roll—would entail a withdrawal of esteem, and would elicit
shame.
In addition to exposure, moreover, we have also added the
possibility for B players tomisinform their matched A about their
actual choice. In particular, in our design, each B subject had
the option to deceive the matched A subject. In particular, each
B could decide to pay a cost for letting the matched A believe
that a bad outcome was due to an unlucky dice roll and not to B’s
choice to keep the whole pot for himself. Since only B players
were informed of this exit option, the resulting game was one
of incomplete information in which the structure of the social
interaction was not common knowledge (see Figure 2).
As with exposure, the exit option has been introduced to
manipulate A’s ex-post information, and should thus be appealing
to players who are motivated by others’ esteem but not to those
who mainly care for not disappointing others’ expectations per
se. Players mainly concerned with esteem could thus exploit the
“wiggle room” created by the exit option (Dana et al., 2006;
for a similar motivation but different design see also Bicchieri
and Chavez, 2010). As a consequence, in our design with the
costly exit option, B players who chose the cooperative outcome
(i.e., ROLL option) were driven by the desire to meet others’
expectations11.
joint project. The success of the joint project is in part due to chance and in part to
howmuch effort B will exert. Since B’s effort is private information, B might decide
spare it.
10Actually, since a trustor cannot know whether or not a trustee has decided
to ROLL, in C&D design the trustor cannot know whether a given trustee has
been in fact good or bad. Hence, those trustees who are mainly concerned with
trustors’ ex-post beliefs about them should be assured that they will not lose their
status. However, we suggest that, in practice, it is very difficult to control for these
inferences and that subtle decisionsmade by experimentersmight have unexpected
epistemic consequences. See below our replication of C&D design for relevant
evidence.
11It should be noted that, like in Dana et al. (2006) and in Bicchieri and Chavez
(2010), our design employed a small form of experimental deception since a
participant, who was randomly assigned the A role, was not informed in the
FIGURE 2 | Trust game with exposure and a costly exit option.
Finally, since, as we have suggested above, this desire can
be understood in two different ways—as guilt aversion or as
perceived legitimacy—we have also measured both empirical
and normative expectations of participants. By identifying which
expectation was in fact related to actual behavior, measuring
expectations has been crucial to determine the motivation that
is more relevant for different types of subjects (see below, for
further details).
Main Treatments
In order to study the role of different motivations for social
norm compliance, we have designed three separate treatments:
Message& Exit, Message and Exit. In addition to these treatments
we have also replicated C&D’s original design that is identical
to our Message treatment but without exposure (Message C&D
treatment). This replication has been conducted to check our
assumption that, notwithstanding its theoretical soundness, C&D
design cannot disentangle the desire for esteem from the desire to
meet others’ expectation. As a consequence, the replication has
provided an indirect validation of our new design.
In the Message & Exit treatment we have employed our trust
game with communication, exposure and the exit option. In
particular, B subjects had the option to let As believe that their
outcome (0) has been the result of an unlucky dice roll instead
of the consequence of B’s deterministic choice not to roll. The
exit option had the following payoffs for A and B subjects: 0e
and 13e. Thus the exit option was costly: by choosing EXIT, B
obtained a lower material payoff (13e) than by choosing DON’T
ROLL (14e).
The Exit treatment was identical to Message & Exit, with the
only difference that the no communication was allowed.
In the Message treatment, we have employed the risky trust
game with exposure and communication but without the exit
option. Figure 3 summarizes the timeline of the three main
treatments and highlights the relevant manipulations.
As it can be verified in Figure 3, the existence of the exit option
is revealed to B subjects only in two treatments, and only after all
experimental instructions about the complete structure of the social situation he or
she was going to face. The decision however to deceive one’s partner by choosing
the exit option was intentionally and autonomously made by subjects playing the
B role.
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FIGURE 3 | Timeline of the three main treatments used in the experiment. The additional Message (C&D) treatment has all the same features of Message but
without exposure (i.e., A is not informed about B’s actual choice).
Bs had decided whether or not to send a message (in Message &
Exit) and after As had decided whether to choose IN or OUT
(Exit and Message & Exit). Thus, the existence of this option
cannot influence either As’ choices or Bs’ decisions of whether
to send a message and, if so, which one.
Belief Elicitation Procedure
To determine whether the desire to meet others’ expectations
depends on others’ empirical expectations (guilt aversion) or
normative ones (perceived legitimacy), we have measured: (1)
A’s empirical expectations on B and B’s second-order empirical
expectations (i.e., what B believes that A expects that B will do);
(2)A’s personal normative beliefs (i.e., what each A privately thinks
a B ought to do) and B’s second-order normative expectations (i.e.,
what B believes that A thinks that B ought to do). Moreover, given
that we are interested in social norm compliance, (3) we have
also elicited the empirical and normative expectations between B
players, i.e., between trustees.
Following C&D procedure, expectations were measured as
follows. After collecting As’ and Bs’ strategic choices, participants
were invited to make guesses about the choices of their
counterparts and their predictions were incentivized. A subjects
were asked to guess the proportion of B subjects who will choose
to ROLL (As’ first order empirical expectations on Bs); while
B subjects were asked to guess the average guess made by As
who had chosen IN (Bs’ second-order empirical expectations on
As). We used the same procedure also to elicit and measure
normative expectations. A subjects were asked if they felt entitled
that B chose ROLL (A’s personal normative beliefs); while Bs were
asked to guess the percentage of As who felt entitled that Bs
chose to ROLL (Bs’ second-order normative expectations on As).
Finally also the normative beliefs of B subjects were elicited, i.e.,
B’s belief that he or she ought to ROLL, and the second-order
normative expectations between Bs, i.e., a B subject’s belief about
other Bs’ beliefs that a B ought to ROLL. With the exception of
As’ or Bs’ personal normative beliefs, all other beliefs have been
elicited with an incentive compatible procedure: players received
additional 5e only if their guess differed no more than 5% points
from the actual percentage.
By measuring these beliefs between treatments with and
without communication, we could thus verify whether our
TABLE 1 | Questions used to elicit different kinds of expectations.
Question Expectation
A SUBJECTS
Guess the % of B’s who chose Roll A’s first-order empirical expectation on B’s
behavior
Do you feel entitled that B chose
Roll?
A’s personal normative belief
B SUBJECTS
Guess the % of Bs who choose Roll
indicated by As
B’s second-order empirical expectations
(belief about A’s belief)
Guess the % of Bs who chose Roll B’s first-order empirical expectation on
other Bs
Do you think you ought to choose
Roll?
B’s personal normative belief
Guess the % of As who feel entitled
that B chose Roll
B’s second-order normative expectations
on A (B’s belief about A’s personal
normative belief)
Guess the % of Bs who think they
ought to choose Roll
B’s second-order normative expectation on
other Bs (B’s belief about other Bs’ personal
normative beliefs)
Original questions were in Italian.
assumption that communication makes a social norm salient was
confirmed. More importantly, we could also observe which kind
of expectations was in fact related to actual behavior.
Table 1 summarizes the belief elicitation task.
Coding Scheme for Messages
In all treatments with communication (Message, Message & Exit,
and Message C&D), Bs’ messages have been coded according to
four categories: “Promise,” “Fairness,” “Mutual Advantage,” and
“Irrelevant.” A message has been classified as a “Promise” if B
explicitly stated his or her intention to ROLL if A had chosen IN.
If no explicit reference to B’s action in the future was made but
the message contained a judgment about some normative feature
of the outcome, it has been classified as “Fairness.” Finally, if B
attempted to influence A by suggesting that the outcome induced
by the IN-ROLL profile would have benefited both members
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FIGURE 4 | The game with payoffs expressed in experimental tokens
(conversion rate: 1 token = 0.05e).
of the dyad, it has been classified as an appeal to “Mutual
Advantage”12. All other messages that did not fall in these three
categories have been classified as “Irrelevant.” The coding has
been realized by two independent judges, who were blind to
the aims of the study. The coding scheme was decided before
data collection and has been devised to check for social norms
that are frequently considered relevant in the contexts of trust
games.
Participants and Procedures
The experiments have been conducted at the CESARE lab of
LUISS University in Rome, Italy. We ran 8 pen and paper
sessions between January 2013 and October 2013 with a total
amount of 318 subjects. All participants provided written
informed consent. The study was carried out in accordance
with the ethical guidelines of the Italian Association of
Psychology (AIP) and approved by the Ethics Committee of
ISTC-CNR.
Each session involved 40 subjects in total, with 20 A subjects
and 20 B subjects (with the exception of one session of the
Message treatment which had 38 subjects, with 19 A subjects and
19 B subjects). A subjects were in the same room and could see
(and count) each other; the same was true for B subjects.
Subjects were all Italian undergraduate students (65.9% from
Economics), with 43.8% females. We employed a between-
subjects design: no individual participated in more than one
session. Payoffs were expressed in experimental tokens and each
token was converted into 0.05e (see Figure 4). In each session,
the participants were paid a 2e show-up fee, plus their earnings
from the experiment. The average payment per participant
was 8.41e (plus the show-up fee) and the sessions averaged
approximately 1 h.
At the beginning of each session, participants were welcomed
in two separate rooms and, once all of them were seated, the
instructions were handed to them in written form before being
12Sugden (2011) has recently suggested that people may also display a motivation
of “mutual advantage” when interacting in situations in which there is an outcome
that is induced if they act jointly and that benefits all participants relative to a
benchmark outcome that each can obtain independently from others’ actions. The
Trust game has precisely this feature.
read aloud by two experimenters. All subjects completed a final
questionnaire containing demographic information, personality
details (i.e., measures of happiness, of generalized trust, of guilt
proneness, and risk aversion) and self-reported motivation for
the decisions made in the experiment.
In each session, participants were referred either as A subjects
or as B subjects. A coin was tossed to determine which room
was A and which was B. Participants were provided with
identification numbers and were informed that these numbers
would have been used to determine pairings (one A with one
B) and to track decisions. Participants in the role of B made
their choices without knowing A’s actual choice of IN or OUT
(strategy method), but they were told that Bs’ choice would be
immaterial if A had chosen OUT. To ensure anonymity, after
all the decisions had been collected, a 6-sided dice was rolled
for each B irrespective of his or her actual decision (i.e., for
those B who chose DON’T ROLL or EXIT, rolling the dice was
inconsequential).
Main Hypotheses
Given that our design is aimed at studying social norm
compliance and at disentangling the role of the desire for others’
esteem from that of the desire to meet others’ expectations, it
follows that:
Hypothesis 1(a): the rate of ROLL choices is higher both in
Message and inMessage & Exit with respect to Exit.
In other words, if communication makes a social norm salient,
the treatments in which Bs can send a message to As will elicit
more social norm compliance (i.e., more ROLL choices) than
when no communication is possible and thus any relevant social
norm would be more ambiguous.
Hypothesis 1(b): the strength of As’ and Bs’ empirical and
normative expectations will be higher both in Message and in
Message & Exit with respect to Exit.
This means that, whenever communication is possible and a
social norm is more salient, both empirical and normative
expectations will be inflated. Alternatively put, communication
strengthens As’ expectations that B will ROLL, B’s beliefs about
these expectations, A’s beliefs to be entitled to B’s rolling the dice,
and B’s beliefs about these normative expectations. The same
holds also for B’s expectations on other Bs.
Hypothesis 2: “Promises” will be more predictive of ROLL
choices than other kind of messages.
Again, if communication can be used to make a social norm
salient, especially in the context of a Trust game in which
one aims to induce another person’s reliance on oneself, B’s
assurances that he or she will indeed ROLL the dice if the other
chooses IN (i.e., “promises”) will unambiguously invoke a norm
of promise-keeping or of keeping one’s word13. Thus, we expect
13See Tummolini et al. (2013) for an extensive discussion of the normative
consequences of inducing reliance on oneself in these contexts. See also Scanlon
(1990) and Thomson (1990) for the special case of promises.
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that by choosing to send a message that can be interpreted as
the intention to ROLL, the rate of social norm compliance (i.e.,
the decision to conform to the rule of keeping one’s word and to
choose in fact ROLL) will be higher.
Hypothesis 3: the rate of ROLL choices is higher inMessage than
inMessage & Exit.
While in Message both the desire for others’ esteem and the
desire to meet others’ expectations might motivate social norm
compliance, in Message & Exit only those who are mainly
motivated to meet others’ expectations will choose to ROLL while
those that are mainly motivated by others’ esteem will choose
EXIT. If this is true, Hypothesis 3 follows.
Taken together the confirmation of Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3
would validate our design and would offer evidence that we have
been able to isolate subjects mainly driven by the desire for others’
esteem from those mainly driven by the desire to meet others’
expectations.
Finally, our design is also intended to empirically establish
whether the desire to meet others’ expectations depends on
empirical expectations (as suggested by guilt aversion theory) or
on normative ones (as suggested by perceived legitimacy). As a
consequence:
Hypothesis 4(a): If guilt aversion is true, ROLL choices in
Message & Exit will correlate with B’s beliefs about A’s empirical
expectations (B’s second-order empirical expectations).
Hypothesis 4(b): If perceived legitimacy is true, ROLL choices
in Message & Exit will correlate with (1) B’s beliefs about A’s
normative expectations and with (2) B’s beliefs about normative
expectations of other Bs.
In other words, if the desire to meet others’ expectations is a form
of guilt aversion, social norm compliance (i.e., ROLL choices in
Message & Exit) is explained by B’s motivation not to disappoint
A’s payoff expectations (A’s empirical expectations). In contrast,
if the same desire is understood as perceived legitimacy, social
norm compliance is explained by B’s motivation not to disappoint
A’s normative expectations, that is, those expectations that B
perceives as legitimate irrespective of A’s payoff expectations. To
put it differently, while guilt aversion predicts that Bs who choose
ROLL in Message & Exit are disposed to comply with the social
norm to avoid the psychological distress they would feel if A
received less than expected (i.e., a form of altruism), perceived
legitimacy predicts that those same Bs are disposed to comply
with the social norm merely because they perceive As’ normative
expectations as legitimate.
Results
Result 1(A): Communication Increases Trust and
Trustworthiness
Results show that A subjects, the Trustors chose IN with a
frequency that equals 43.5% (17 of 39), whereas the percentage
of Bs, the Trustees who decided to ROLL is 53.8% (21 of 39) in
Message treatment; percentages are 22.5% (9 of 40) and 17.5%
(7 of 40) in the Exit treatment, and 42.5% (17 of 40), and
32.5% (13 of 40) in the Message & Exit treatment, respectively.
B subjects chose EXIT in 22.5% (9 out of 40) cases in the
Exit treatment, and 20% (8 out of 40) in the Message & Exit
Treatment.
Figure 5 summarizes A’s choices in Message, Exit, Message &
Exit treatments. Results of Message (C&D) will be discussed
separately in the next section.
In Exit, where there is no opportunity to receive a message, A
subjects chose IN significantly less than in Message and Message
& Exit, where B subjects could send them a message (z one-sided
test, p = 0.002, and p = 0.003 respectively).
Figure 6 summarizes Bs’ choices in Message, Exit, Message &
Exit treatments.
There is a significant difference in Bs’ decisions to ROLL
between Exit and Message (p = 0.000, z one-sided test), and—
although at a lower degree of significance—between Exit and
Message & Exit (p = 0.062, z one-sided test). For a comparison
between Message and Message & Exit, see below the section on
Result 3.
Thus, in line with previous research on the role of
communication in social dilemma kind of situations (for reviews
see Sally, 1995 and Balliet, 2010), these results confirm that
communication significantly increases trust and trustworthiness,
and hence also our Hypothesis 1(a).
Result 1(B): Communication Strengthens
Empirical and Normative Expectations
Figure 7 compares A’s empirical and normative expectations
across treatments. See Table 1 above for a description of all the
different beliefs and expectations elicited.
As’ empirical expectations on Bs’ behavior and their normative
expectations of a trustworthy behavior have been inflated by the
presence of the message: there is a significantly higher level of
both beliefs when comparing Message & Exit with Exit (p =
0.000 and p = 0.027 respectively, z two-sided test) and Message
with Exit (p = 0.000 and p = 0.002 respectively, z two-
sided test). A’s beliefs do not differ between Message & Exit and
Message.
Furthermore, the level of As’ empirical expectations and
normative beliefs are generally not significantly different from
each other across treatments, with the exception of Message
where the difference is significant (t = −1.7193, p = 0.046, one-
sample t-test). SinceMessage andMessage & Exit differed only in
the use of the exit option, but this option was ignored by As and
was revealed to Bs only after their decision to send a message,
the higher level of As’ normative expectations is probably due to
the kind of message that As received in this treatment. Indeed, in
Message, B subjects promised more frequently than inMessage &
Exit (see Figure 10 below).
Bs’ second-order normative expectations and Bs’ second-order
empirical expectations on As are characterized by similar results,
summarized in Figure 8. Figure 9 summarizes the average level
of Bs empirical expectations on other Bs, their guesses about one
another’s expectations (second-order empirical expectations) and
Bs’ personal normative beliefs.
Overall these results confirm that communication has inflated
both trustors’ expectations (As’ beliefs) and trustees’ beliefs about
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FIGURE 5 | As’ choices in different treatments.
trustors’ beliefs (Bs’ second-order empirical expectations on As).
At the same time, communication has also boosted trustees’
beliefs about trustors’ normative expectations and the belief about
what was normatively expected of them by other B subjects in the
same role.
Importantly, we have also found that there is “consensus”
(Bicchieri et al., 2011) between Bs’ personal normative beliefs
and B’s second-order normative expectation on other Bs,
but only in treatments where Bs could send a message: there
is no significant effect in the Exit treatment, but there is a
significant effect in Message & Exit (Spearman correlation test,
with coef. = 0.304, p = 0.056) and in Message (Spearman
correlation test, with coef. = 0.462, p = 0.003). Additionally,
only within subjects in Exit there is a significant difference
between Bs’ personal normative beliefs and B’s second-order
normative expectation on other Bs (t = −4.888, p = 0.000,
one-sample t-test), which confirms that without communication
the social norm was less salient between subjects. These
results support our Hypothesis 1(b) that communication
makes a social norm salient by boosting the relevant
expectations.
Result 2: Communication Makes a Social Norm
of Promise Keeping Salient
In order to test for Hypothesis 2, we first explore how
communication was actually employed. As far as the decision
to send a message is concerned, there is no difference between
Message and Message & Exit: 36 out of 39 write a message in
Message & Exit, 35 out of 40 in Message (p = 0.240, z one-sided
test).
With regard to the content of these messages, Figure 10
summarizes the frequency of each content category across
treatments (for the coding scheme, see Section Coding Scheme
for Messages).
B subjects in Message & Exit promised less frequently than in
Message (43% vs. 70%, p = 0.009, z one-sided test); messages
referring to fairness or mutual advantage were equally frequent
in the messages of the two treatments (p = 0.312 and p = 0.285
respectively, z one-sided test).
Receiving a message did not increase the frequency of
IN choices per se (z one-sided test, p = 0.306) but the
probability to choose IN increased significantly when As
received a message containing a promise (from 35.38 to 50%
of IN choices, p = 0.046) or when B referred to a fair
split of the pie (from 40.91 to 80% of IN choices, p =
0.043). There was no effect when the message appealed to
mutual advantage in order to influence IN choices (p =
0.338).
More importantly, a message containing a promise has
determined a significantly larger choice of ROLL (z one-sided
test, p = 0.048). An appeal to outcome fairness or to mutual
advantage did not affect either EXIT or ROLL choices of B
subjects.
These results allow us to conclude that communication has
made a social norm of promise-keeping especially salient (our
Hypothesis 2), and that communication has influenced Bs’
trustworthiness by motivating compliance primarily with this
norm.
Moreover, considering that Bs were informed about the exit
option only after having sent their messages, it is suggestive
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FIGURE 6 | Bs’ choices in different treatments.
FIGURE 7 | A’s empirical expectation on B’s ROLL decisions and A’s personal normative beliefs.
also that Bs who promised were less likely to choose EXIT:
from 16.13 to 5% of EXIT choices (p = 0.0642, z one-sided
test). A message referring to fairness or mutual advantage
was not similarly effective (p = 0.220 and p = 0.176
respectively, z one-sided test). In other words, other possibly
relevant norms like a norm of fairness or an appeal to mutual
advantage do not seem to influence trustworthiness in this
experiment.
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FIGURE 8 | Bs’ normative expectations on As and second-order empirical expectations on As.
Result 3: Social Norm Compliance Can Be Driven
Both by the Desire for Others’ Esteem and by the
Desire to Meet Others’ Expectations
Following our Hypothesis 3 we have tested whether ROLL
decisions significantly differ between Message and Message &
Exit (see Figure 6). As expected, they do (p = 0.028, z one-
sided test): B subjects chose to ROLL significantly more in
Message.
More than 20% of Bs chose the EXIT option in both
treatments where it was available (more precisely, 8 subjects
out of 40 in Message & Exit and 9 out of 40 in Exit),
and there is no difference in the use of this option between
Message & Exit and Exit (p = 0.3940). Sending (or not) the
message per se does not seem to affect the choice of the EXIT
option.
Moreover, and more importantly for our aims, we find that
there is no significant difference in DON’T ROLL choices across
treatments (46.15% in Message, 60% in Exit and 47.5% in
Message & Exit; p = 0.110, p = 0.452 and p = 0.132 respectively,
z one-sided test).
Thus, given that, as we have shown before, subjects decided to
ROLL significantly more when the exit option was not available,
we can infer that subjects who choose to EXIT belongs to the
ROLL pool: i.e., these are subjects that would have chosen to be
trustworthy (i.e., to ROLL) if their violations were observable.
This confirms our Hypothesis 3 and validates our design, whose
aim is to disentangle players who comply with the social
norm because of what others think of them—the desire for
others’ esteem—from players motivated not to disappoint others’
expectations.
Result 4: When Nobody Can Monitor Violations,
Compliance with a Social Norm Is Driven by the
Perceived Legitimacy of Normative Expectations
Taken together Results 1, 2, and 3 allow us to conclude that our
design has been successful in making a given social norm salient,
in promoting social norm compliance, and in isolating two key
motivations behind it. However, we still have to showwhether the
desire to meet others’ expectations depends on others’ empirical
expectations (Hypothesis 4a) or normative ones (Hypothesis 4b).
Table 2 shows that, in general, there is a significant correlation
between B’s second-order empirical expectations on A only in
case ofMessage treatment.
Interestingly, if we pool together subjects who chose to ROLL
and to EXIT (i.e., those who avoided to publicly violate the
norm) in Message & Exit, the correlation between B’s choice
and B’s second-order empirical expectation on A is significant
as well (coef. 0.238, p = 0.035) like that with second-order
empirical expectations on other Bs (coef. 0.248, p = 0.027).
Since, as we have established before (see the previous section),
the pool of subjects who chose to ROLL in Message includes
also subjects that were motivated by others’ esteem and were
worried to lose it, we may conclude that the correlation between
B’s second-order empirical expectations and behavior cannot
reliably be used as evidence for one motivation in particular.
Moreover, if, in Message, we restrict the analysis to subjects
who have sent a message containing a promise (i.e., those
who should have mainly been moved by guilt aversion), the
correlation between B’s second-order empirical expectations
on A and B’s choice is not significant (coef. = 0.115, p =
0.582). On the other hand, both analyses suggest that our
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FIGURE 9 | Empirical and normative expectations among Bs about Bs’ decisions to ROLL.
FIGURE 10 | Proportions of messages with different contents.
manipulation has been successful in disentangling the two key
motivations.
In contrast, as Table 3 shows, Bs’ choices are significantly
correlated with Bs’ second-order normative expectations both on
As and Bs as well as with Bs’ personal normative beliefs: Bs’
willingness to comply with the social norm, and to ROLL, is
increasing with their second-order normative expectations on
As and on other Bs while their willingness to violate it, and
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TABLE 2 | Correlation between Bs’ second-order empirical expectations on A, Bs’ empirical expectations on other Bs and Bs’ behavior.
Message Exit Message & Exit
On As On other Bs On As On other Bs On As On other Bs
EXIT
Coefficient – – 0.054 0.058 0.085 0.215
(p-value) – – (0.736) (0.719) (0.598) (0.181)
ROLL
Coefficient 0.487*** 0.240 0.024 0.048 −0.105 0.147
(p-value) (0.001) (0.141) (0.881) (0.767) (0.518) (0.363)
DON’T ROLL
Coefficient −0.487*** −0.240 −0.065 −0.087 0.055 −0.267
(p-value) (0.001) (0.141) (0.687) (0.591) (0.733) (0.094)
***p < 0.01.
choose DON’T ROLL, is increasing, the lower these normative
expectations are.
Taken together these results confirm Hypothesis 4(b) over
the alternative 4(a), and thus indicate that the desire to meet
others’ expectations depends on normative expectations and not
on empirical ones, i.e., on what others think one ought to do
and not on what others think that one will probably do. In other
words, perceived legitimacy explains social norm compliance, but
guilt aversion does not.
Can Empirical Expectations of Others Be
Perceived as Illegitimate?
Given that guilt aversion theory predicts a positive correlation
between second-order empirical expectations and behavior,
B’s willingness to ROLL should be increasing in his second-
order empirical expectations: the stronger B’s beliefs about A’s
expectations are, the more B should be moved to meet them.
However, in our Message & Exit treatment Bs’ second-order
empirical expectations on As do not correlate with Bs’ choice
to ROLL. A possible reason that would explain the lack of
such correlation is that As’ empirical expectations might have
been considered themselves ungrounded, and thus illegitimate,
by Bs (for an analogous objection to guilt aversion see also
Sugden, 2009, p. 270). In other words, if only an appropriate
range of As’ expectations are perceived by B subjects as justified,
a correlation between second-order expectations and choices
would be absent14. In order to test this additional hypothesis we
have conducted the following analyses.
Considering all three treatments, on average, Bs who chose
ROLL have higher second-order empirical expectations than Bs
14Another possible reason for the lack of correlation between second-order
empirical expectations and behavior in this game is that there is also incomplete
information about Bs’ “guilt types”. Indeed, Attanasi et al. (2013) have shown that
with incomplete information about guilt-types, B subjects should display more
dispersed beliefs and more heterogeneity of behavior. Interestingly, they also show
that it exists a parameter region “where B subjects would cooperate and hold
high second-order beliefs under complete information but exhibit less cooperative
behavior and intermediate second-order beliefs under incomplete information” (p.
23). For the formal analysis of a trust game with incomplete information about
guilt-types see Attanasi et al. (2015). Since in our design we do not control for
information about guilt-types, we cannot exclude this alternative interpretation of
our results.
who chose DON’T ROLL: Bs who chose ROLL thought that 41%
of As expected Bs to choose ROLL, Bs who chose DON’T ROLL
thought that 29% of As expected Bs to choose ROLL, and Bs
who chose EXIT thought that 33% of As expected Bs to choose
ROLL. There is a significant difference between expectations of Bs
who chose ROLL with respect to those who chose DON’T ROLL
(p = 0.002, Mann-Whitney, two-tailed test for all the analyses
in this section), but not between expectations of Bs who chose
DON’T ROLL and those who chose EXIT (p = 0.793) or between
Bs who chose ROLL and those who chose EXIT (p = 0.127)15.
Interestingly, however, if we build a sub-sample of Bs with
high beliefs on As expectations (≤0.50) and another one of Bs
with low expectations (>0.50), what emerges is that the second-
order expectations of B subjects who chose ROLL (average
expectation 30%) are significantly higher than those who chose
DON’T ROLL (average expectation 19%) but only in the
subsample in which these expectations are equal or below the 0.50
threshold (p = 0.003). In the sub-sample in which B subjects
had high expectations (>0.50), there was no difference in the
level of second-order empirical expectations between the subjects
who chose ROLL (average expectation 68%) and DON’T ROLL
(average expectation 69%), with p = 0.77816.
When considering the exit option, we observe exactly the
opposite effect. B subjects who chose EXIT were those with
the highest beliefs on As’ empirical expectations: i.e., there is a
significant difference in the level of second-order expectations
between Bs who chose EXIT (average expectation 76%) and
Bs who chose DON’T ROLL (average expectation 69%), and
between Bs who choose EXIT and Bs who chose ROLL (average
expectation 68%), but only when considering B subjects whose
expectations on As were above the 0.50 threshold (p = 0.000)17.
Considering also that subjects who chose EXIT typically also
did not promise, these results suggest that high expectations of A
subjects, absent a relevant social norm, might have driven Bs to
choose EXIT maybe because they perceived that too much was
15The latter non-significance is likely due—at least partially—to the limited
number of subjects who chose EXIT.
16In the subsample of Bs with low expectations (≤0.50), 29% of subjects chose
ROLL, 49% of subjects chose DON’T ROLL and 13% of subjects chose EXIT.
17In the subsample of Bs with high expectations (>0.50), 43% of subjects chose
ROLL, 43% of subjects chose DON’T ROLL and 14% of subjects chose EXIT.
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expected of them, i.e., such expectations were not perceived as
reasonable.
Replication of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
In addition to our main design (the trust game with exposure
and costly exit option), we have also conducted an additional
treatment to replicate the original Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006)’s design: the Message (C&D) treatment. We used exactly
the same procedure and instructions, with the following two
exceptions:
a) Earnings were expressed in tokens (then converted in
euros when paying subjects at the end of the experiment).
Nonetheless, the vector of payoffs respected exactly the same
relative magnitude—across players and across outcomes—
chosen in the Message (5,5) treatment by Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006). Each token in our Message (C&D)
treatment corresponded to 0.05 dollars in Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006) Message (5,5) treatment (and were
converted in exactly the same amount of euros when we paid
subjects);
b) Participants were divided in two separate rooms.
Results show that A subjects exhibited a frequency of IN choices
that equals 65% (26 of 40), whereas the percentage of Bs who
decided to ROLL is 42.5% (17 of 40). Messages were sent in the
87.5% (35 of 40) of cases: 57.14% (20 of 35) of them contained a
promise.
When compared to our Message treatment, A subjects chose
IN significantly more in Message (C&D): 43.6% vs. 65% (z
one-sided test, p = 0.028), whereas there is no significant
difference in Bs’ choice to ROLL (z one-sided test, p = 0.158).
Therefore, our experiment does not replicate the exposure
effect reported by Tadelis (2011) and Bracht and Regner
(2013).
More importantly for our aims, we have also not found
any correlation between Bs’ beliefs and their choices. Whereas,
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) found that Bs who chose ROLL
made significantly higher guesses about As’ guesses than did
Bs who chose DON’T ROLL, in our experiment there is no
significant correlation between Bs’ second-order beliefs and Bs’
choice to ROLL (coef. = 0.222, p = 0.168). Furthermore, also
Bs’ second-order normative expectations are not significantly
correlated with their ROLL choices (coef. = 0.216, p = 0.180).
Our results are thus in agreement with Ellingsen et al. (2010)
and Kawagoe and Narita (2014) who fail to report any significant
correlation between second-order expectations and choices in the
original C&D design.
Since the experimental conditions of our Message (C&D) are
identical (with the exception of having participants seated in two
separate rooms), the difference in this result might be ascribed to
higher protection of anonymity that separating As from Bs in two
rooms allows18. Sitting in the same room and being able to look at
each other might have caused Bs to doubt that their choices were
18As suggested before, a different explanation for this replication failure points
to the fact that these designs are all characterized by incomplete information
about guilt-types of participants. For a design in which complete and incomplete
information about guilt-types is controlled, see Attanasi et al. (2013).
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really obscure to As at the end of the experiment in Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006)’s setup; this is less likely to occur in
our replication. We conclude that in our Message treatment the
exposure condition is responsible for the correlation between
second-order empirical expectations and choices, and that this
correlationmainly reflects the importance of the desire for others’
esteem rather than guilt aversion.
Discussion
Relying on the role that verbal communication plays in making
a norm salient (Bicchieri, 2002), our design has been able to
disentangle (1) the role in social norm compliance of the desire
for others’ esteem from that played by the desire to meet others’
expectations and (2) to test two alternative ways of understanding
the latter motivation. Results indicate that both motivations
can in fact support social norm compliance (Result 3), but
that only the desire to meet others’ expectation can induce
compliance even when one could violate with no material or
immaterial sanction in sight. Moreover, we have shown that
such desire depends on the normative expectations that other
people have on oneself (Result 4). Thus, it is the perceived
legitimacy of such expectations to motivate compliance, and
not—as guilt aversion theory suggests (Sugden, 2000; Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006)—an altruistic aversion to disappoint
others.
As a consequence, the evidence collected in this study is
not compatible with Charness and Dufwenberg’s conjecture that
“guilt aversionmay provide a form ofmicrofoundation” for social
norm compliance (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, p. 1596),
though it does not exclude that dynamic psychological game
theory (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009) could be the right tool
to model such microfoundation. Bicchieri and Sontuoso (2015),
for example, have proposed a model of “conditionally conformist
preferences” in which a player, B, who is considering whether or
not to violate a social norm, anticipate the disutility he would
experience if he were to disappoint others’ payoff expectations.
Crucially, in this model, the payoff expectations of other players
are formed on the assumption that B will follow the operative
social norm, and thus B’s utility is a function of his second-order
normative expectations.
We would also like to emphasize that our results question the
role of guilt aversion as a motivation for social norm compliance
but are not necessarily in contrast with guilt aversion as a relevant
motivation in other contexts. Here the crucial point is that the
kind of guilt modeled by guilt aversion theory presupposes a form
of caring for another person’s fate that seems to bemore common
between friends than between anonymous strangers in one-
shot encounters. Actually, psychologists of emotions distinguish
between two kinds of guilt: guilt from harm and guilt from norm
violation (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 1998; for a review see Carnì
et al., 2013). Guilt aversion theory has been mainly motivated
by the so-called “interpersonal perspective” of Baumeister et al.
(1994), which posits that an important kind of guilt results from
the awareness of having caused unjustified harm to another. This
feeling is based on empathy and compassion (Weiss, 1986) and is
predicted to be a function of the social distance between people.
If so, guilt from harm is what guilt aversion theory aims to
model.
A quite different origin of guilt feelings is due, however, to the
mere violation of a norm. Interestingly, one can experience this
kind of guilt even when breaking the norm is not observable and
does not harm anybody else. Think, for instance, at the violation of
dietary norms socially enforced in ethno-religious groups like, for
instance, Jews. Who will be harmed, should one group member
eat some pork in private? If nobody is watching, nobody will
be harmed, nor can be offended. Still, those who contemplate
the violation of this norm might anticipate the guilt they would
experience were they to eat pork anyway. In this perspective,
the perceived legitimacy of others’ expectations on our behavior
might indeed induce guilt if one were to disappoint them even in
absence of whatever empathetic identification with a victim.
Interestingly, recent neuroscientific evidence suggests that
guilt from harm and guilt from norm violation might even
be processed differently in the brain (Basile et al., 2011), and
that neuronal networks that are selectively activated when
experiencing guilt from norm violation, like the left and right
insula, are also activated in a task similar to the one we have used
in this study (Chang et al., 2011).
Conclusion
Even if it is often contrary to ones’ own material self-interest,
people recurrently comply with social norms in everyday
interactions. Plausibly, people behave as socially expected
for multiple reasons, though different individuals might be
predominantly moved by different concerns when deciding
whether to comply with a social norm.
Aside from fear of peer punishment, which—if not at all
overestimated (Guala, 2012)—certainly is the most explored
explanation, we have focused on two alternatives that have
attracted less attention: the desire for others’ esteem (and to avoid
shame) and a desire to meet others’ expectations on oneself.
Theoretically, it has been shown that both motivations could
be sufficient to sustain social norms (Bernheim, 1994; Sugden,
2004; Bicchieri, 2006), but their empirical relevance is not known.
Focusing on these motivations is interesting also because each
might help to explain compliance with social norms in different
contexts. If a desire to meet others’ expectations exists, for
instance, it would explain why some people comply with social
norms even if nobody is there to monitor. Though establishing
the existence of such desire is important in itself, it is however
unclear what exactly its scope is: does this desire depend on
others’ empirical or normative expectations on oneself?
Here we have gathered new evidence that the desire to meet
others’ expectations is a crucial motivation for social norm
compliance and that the perceived legitimacy of others’ normative
expectations is what sustains it, at least when no one is around to
police.
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